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This paper represents some preliminary results of a 
larger research project on comparative modernizations on 
Taiwan and mainland China that I have been conducting. I 
wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor Gaston J. 
Sigur and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of The George 
Washington University for a summer research grant in 1982 
that enabled me to do interviews in Taiwan in June-August 
and research in Hong Kong in August, 1982. My research 
in Taiwan was greatly facilitated by a grant from the Na-
tional Science Council of the Republic of China, especially 
the assistance by Dr. Wang Chi-wu, director of the Council. 
While in Taipei, I conducted interviews with former Presi-
dent C.K. Yen, Minister K.T. Li, Wan-an Yeh of the Coun-
cil for Economic Planning and Development, Dr. Yung Wei 
of the Executive Yuan, and Professor Tso-yung Wang, all of 
whom spent their valuable time to talk to me. I am deeply 
grateful to them. I am, of course, solely responsible for the 
views expressed in this paper. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most dramatic episodes in the post-war world is the 
recovery of the Chinese Nationalist government from its defeat on 
Chinese mainland. When the Nationalist government moved to Tai-
* Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor of Political Science, Uni-
versity of California at Santa Barbara. 
(1) 
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wan in December, 1949, the United States expected the momentary 
fall of the island to the communist hands. 1 The ruling Kuomintang 
had probably lost more than ninety percent of its members and half of 
its top leaders. Economically, Taiwan was in ruin, with inflation run-
ning about 300 per cent in 1950. Nowadays scholars in America 
widely assume that the Kuomintang had taken with it to Taiwan a 
large number of skilled personnel. However, it is less well-known that 
over 95 percent of the staff of the prestigious National Resources 
Commission (Tzu-yuan Wei-yuan Hui) in which had concentrated the 
best scientists and engineers on the mainland had defected to the com-
munist side (and, by the act, were to be wasted in Mao's China). 2 
There seemed to be no prospect for the Nationalists to survive, let 
alone prosper. In thirty years, however, the Republic of China pulled 
itself out of the jaws of defeat and demoralization and has now stands 
at the front rank among the newly industrialized countries of East 
Asia. The per capita national income in Taiwan in 1981 was US 
$2,334, ten times that of mainland China. With 1952 as base year, by 
1981, the gross national product had grown by nine times, real per 
capita GNP had grown by five times, agricultural production nearly 
doubled, and the industrial production index registered a growth of 41 
times that of 1952.3 In 1981, the American organization The Environ-
mental Fund ranked nations on a scale of 1 to 100 in terms of quality 
of life (infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and literacy); Tai-
wan was rated 86 and mainland China, 69 (the U.S. was rated 94).4 
These stunning achievements of the Republic of China are all the more 
impressive if one considers that they were obtained in spite of having 
one of the highest rates of population growth and density, the termina-
tion of U.S. aid in 1965 and severe diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s. 
The purpose of this paper is to, borrowing from Professor W ou Wei, 5 
solve (at least partially) the riddle of the spectacular feats of the Re-
public of China in the last thirty years. 
Much has been written about Taiwan's economic development by 
I. See, e.g., the U.S. State Department pronouncement in Hungdah Chiu, ed., China 
and the Question of Taiwan, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 217-220. 
2. The 95 per cent figure is given by Chiang Kai-shek in 1952, see Ch'in Hsiao-yi, ed., 
Tsung-t'ung Yen-fun-chi (President Chiang's Speeches), Volume Three (On Education and 
Youth), Taipei: Chung-hua Wen-hua Ch'u-pan Shih-yeh-she, 1963, p. 312. 
3. "Quality of Life Linked to Growth, Prosperity," Free China Quarterly, (August 21, 
1983), p. 2. 
4. "Sweden Top-ranked Country in Quality of Life Survey," Santa Barbara News-
Press, (November 12, 1981), p. C-9. 
5. Wou Wei, Chih-k'ai Tai-wan Ching-chi Fa-chan Tzu-mi (Solve the Riddle of Tai-
wan's Economic Growth), Taipei: Yuan-ching Ch'u-pan-shih-yeh Company, 1980. 
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economists.6 I, therefore, wish to stress the political factors that have 
made Taiwan's spectacular achievements possible. More specifically, I 
will discuss political stability, the establishment of a community of 
modernizers and the rise of a new entrepreneurial class on Taiwan. 
POLITICAL STABILITY THROUGH TUTELARY 
DEMOCRACY 
By now most writers on Taiwan have acknowledged the crucial 
importance of political stability to the country's development for the 
last thirty-some years. 7 Central to Taiwan's political stability and 
growth are three ingredients: the role of the late President Chiang Kai-
shek, the rejuvenation of the Kuomintang, and the establishment of a 
tutelary democracy on Taiwan. 
The Role of President Chiang Kai-shek 
In retrospect, one of the major keys to Taiwan's stability and de-
velopment is the personality and leadership of the late President Chi-
ang Kai-shek. First of all, Chiang put the KMT defeat on the 
mainland in proper perspective, thereby stemming the tide of defeat-
ism and demoralization in the crucial years of 1949-1951. Announc-
ing the start of reform of the Kuomintang in July, 1950, Chiang 
stated, "The reason for the defeat of our anti-Communist campaign on 
the mainland is not due to great strength of the Communists but the 
disintegration of our party."8 More specifically Chiang pointed to 
widespread factionalism in the Kuomintang and its refusal to work 
with people and groups not belonging to the Nationalist Party. This 
accurate diagnosis set the tone for the rebuilding of the Kuomintang, 
which was crucial for Taiwan's development. Second, despite defeat, 
Chiang never lost sight of his personal values and confidence. Ever 
since the early 1930s when Chiang took the lead in building and mod-
ernizing China, he believed the fundamental worth of traditional Chi-
nese virtues and ethics, e.g., the Four Cardinal Principles and Eight 
Virtues (Ssu Wei, Pa Te). It was quite perceptive of Chiang to see 
then what is now acknowledged by many Western scholars-tradi-
6. See, for example, Samuel P.S. Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970, 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978; and John C.H. Fei, Gustav Rains 
and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1979. 
7. Ralph N. Clough, Island China, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1978. 
8. Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1950 (1950 Yearbook of the Republic of China), 
Taipei: Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien·chien-she, 1951, p. 121. 
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tional ethos are not necessarily incompatible with modernization; on 
the contrary, in many instances, traditional values facilitate the change 
from an agrarian to an industrial society.9 On Taiwan, amidst doubts 
and uncertainty about the future, Chiang reaffirmed the fundamental 
worth of traditional Chinese ethics. As he told a gathering of high-
rank Kuomintang leaders in 1951: 10 
Some have expressed the view that the four Cardinal Princi-
ples and Eight Virtues are anachronistic in our current strug-
gle with the communists. This is a serious mistake. Based 
on my own experience and our recent defeat, my faith in the 
four Cardinal Principles and Eight Virtues as the spiritual 
pillar of our salvation and struggle with the Communists has 
been reaffirmed. 
Chiang stressed that what he advocated was not mechanical or literal 
application of the old ethos, but rather the spirit of it. Chiang's self-
confidence and unswerving faith in the most basic traditional Chinese 
values must have had a becalming, affirmative and even integrating 
impact on Taiwan. Chiang's appeal to traditional Chinese values had 
an integrative impact because these values have been the single most 
solid bond between the native people of Taiwan and those from the 
mainland after 1945. The world, especially those in America, only 
recently have started to appreciate the constructive roles that old Chi-
nese values have played in Taiwan's modernization. American jour-
nalists and scholars are now bandying about "Confucian capitalism" 
on Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and even Japan, though thirty 
years ago it was popular to attribute the defeat of Kuomintang on 
Chinese mainland to its adherence of these same Confucian values. 
John Fairbank, for example, wrote disdainfully about "Nanking's new 
leaders had not been able to modernize their own thinking." 11 The 
comparative history of Taiwan and mainland China in the last thirty 
years has borne out Chiang Kai-shek, not Professor Fairbank. As 
early as 1952, Chiang had perceptively pointed out that it is the Soviet 
system that is truly feudalistic, not the Kuomintang's advocacy of 
traditional Chinese values. 12 The admissions of the Communist Party 
of China after the death of Mao illustrated clearly President Chiang's 
observation. 
9. See, for example, S.N. Eisenstadt, ed., Post-Traditional Societies, New York: W.W. 
North & Company, Inc., 1972. 
10. Ch'in Hsiao-yi, Volume Three, supra note 2, p. 297. 
II. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, Third Edition, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 243. 
12. Ch'in Hsiao-yi, Volume Three, supra note 2, p. 313. 
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Through his correct and rational diagnosis of the cause of the 
defeat of the Kuomintang on the mainland and his affirmation of the 
fundamental values of Chinese culture, Chiang gave the people of Tai-
wan a secure sense of identity and direction for the future. In addition 
to that, Chiang Kai-shek, in the early 1950s, set the right priority in 
national development. Contrary to the view that Chiang had mort-
gaged Taiwan's development to his desire of recovering Chinese main-
land, Chiang's stress from the start was first to build Taiwan. In the 
Kuomintang communique on party reform in 1950, it is stated, "We 
must start from Taiwan. We must not only defend but also build Tai-
wan."13 Chiang declared in 1951, "What we should be concerned 
with is not that we are unable to take the mainland back but that we 
are incapable of building Taiwan up." 14 [emphasis added] 
Last, the personality of Chiang Kai-shek was conducive to na-
tional reconstruction in a time of peace. American scholar Lucian Pye 
suggests that there are two types of leadership in national develop-
ment. The first type consists of those seemingly charismatic leaders in 
the newly independent nations who rely on ideological pronounce-
ments to mobilize their countrymen. Unfortunately, as Pye puts it, 
"the universal pattern has been one of leaders communicating uncer-
tainty and confusion as they have failed to resolve the crisis of identity 
in their own persous; . . . When ideological pronouncements seem to 
ring more false than true, people tend to withdraw from the search for 
a collective identity, and politics is likely to become an arena for op-
portunism."15 The second type of leadership is provided by those who 
have already a strong and secure sense of identity and competence and 
who then assist others to find their own sense of identity through the 
mastery of demanding skills. The history of mainland China and Tai-
wan in the last thirty years has shown unmistakably that Mao Tse-
tung belonged to the first, and Chiang Kai-shek to the second type 
leadership. Whereas Mao relied on ideological pronouncements 
which amounted to demagogy and brought mainland China to the 
verge of collapse, Chiang made use of the few highly educated special-
ista and professionals who went to Taiwan to develop the country 
without fanfare or demagogy. From the office of Chiang Kai-shek no 
inflammatory slogans similar to the communist "Socialist transforma-
tion," "Great Leap Forward," or "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
13. Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1950, supra note 7, p. 127. 
14. Ch'in Hsiao-yi, ed., Tsung-t'ung Yen-fun-chi (President Chiang's Speeches), Vol-
ume One (On Politics), Taipei: Chung-hua Wen-hua Ch'u-pan Shih-yeh-she, 1966, p. 317. 
15. Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building, Burman's Search for 
Identity, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963, pp. 288-289. 
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tion" were ever pronounced. Chiang's way was subtle yet persistent 
exertion on the numerous practical tasks of building a nation. In 1950 
while explaining the need for major reform of the Kuomintang Chiang 
had this to say to his followers: 
Almost everyone of our comrades has the view that our fail-
ure in the anti-communist struggle is due to our not carrying 
out the Principle of People's Livelihood on the mainland. 
Every comrade also knows that henceforth in our anti-com-
munist struggle we must rely on the Principle of People's 
Livelihood. However, let me ask: During the past four years 
on the mainland did any of our Party branches in the villages 
ever carry out land surveys? Did any city Party office con-
duct any labor surveys? Did any provincial Party office sub-
mit any report based on systematic social and economic 
surveys? The realization of the Principle of People's Liveli-
hood is through actual practice, not just theoretical 
discussion. 16 
To stress the need for practical work, Chiang established theRe-
search Institute for the Practice of Revolution (Ke-rning Shih-chien 
Yen-chiu Yuan) on Taiwan, with special emphasis on the word "prac-
tice." All high and middle rank Kuomintang members were required 
to study in this institute. 
Chiang's preference for quiet and practical work is complemented 
by his respect for modern professions and specialists. Unlike Mao, 
Chiang had no anti-intellectual or anti-specialist bias. According to 
economist Tso-yung Wang, President Chiang readily listened to the 
advice of professional economists. Chiang had no definite theory of 
economic development of his own though he, of course, was commit-
ted to making China a modern nation. 17 This ideological flexibility 
and tolerance on the part of Chiang enabled a group of specialists and 
professional economists to use their talents and knowledge to build 
Taiwan steadily over the past three decades. 
For quite some time (and there continues to be so in some schol-
arly circles in the West), there was naive reverence for Mao Tse-tung 
in the West simply because Mao was known as "an intellectual." 
What is often glossed over is the thin line between a radical intellec-
tual such as Mao and a demagogue. Radical intellectuals, especially 
those in the newly independent countries, as Edward Shils points out, 
are not particularly helpful or constructive in a nation's moderniza-
16. Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1950, supra note 7, p. 123. 
17. Interview with Professor Wang in Taipei, July, 1982. 
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tion. 18 National development requires not inflammatory rhetoric but 
work ethic and professional competence. To contrast the style of lead-
ership of Mao and Chiang, Edward Shils' remarks are worth 
quoting: 19 
Another danger in demagogy is that what it so quickly cre-
ates-other than religious or quasi-religious attitudes formed 
by conversion-does not go deeply into the dispositional 
structure, and it does not last. It is merely enthusiasm, and 
it is in the nature of enthusiasm not to last in most people. It 
is also in the nature of enthusiasm to generate expectations 
for large and basic transformations in the order which it con-
fronts, and the situation of the new states is not such as to 
satisfy such expectations. 
It is not the flash of enthusiasm but persistently sus-
tained exertion that is the prerequisite of national develop-
ment-not just because such exertion may be a moral virtue 
in itself, but because it is required by the complex undertak-
ings which are on the program of modernization. 
The thirty-some years of social and economic development on main-
land China under communist rule and Taiwan under the governorship 
of the Kuomintang shows unmistakably that the leadership of Mao 
Tse-tung was demagogic, whereas that of Chiang Kai-shek was based 
on persistent and positive work ethic. 
Rejuvenation of the Kuomintang 
Next to the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, rejuvenation of the 
Kuomintang after 1950 has played a crucial role in Taiwan's political 
stability and economic growth. As mentioned earlier, President Chi-
ang set the rational tone for the reorganization of the Kuomintang in 
1950. Despite defeat and defection from the rank of the party, bloody 
purge or recrimination did not mar Chiang's party reform-quite a 
feat for any political organization in a state of crisis. 
In reforming the Kuomintang, Chiang had two aims in mind-to 
create a coherent elite and an effective organizational structure so as to 
link the Kuomintang with every sector of society. The key to the first 
aim is the composition of the 16-member Central Reform Commission 
18. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," 
World Politics, XII, No. 3, (April 1960), pp. 329-368. 
19. Edward Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New 
St:1tes" in Lucian W. Pye, ed., Communications and Political Development, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University F;ess, 1969, p. 65. 
8 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
established in July, 1950, to undertake the task of rejuvenating the 
Kuomintang. The commission was headed by the then Governor of 
Taiwan Ch'en Ch'eng. Perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of 
the membership of this commission was the absence of those Kuomin-
tang leaders such as the C.C. clique (a conservative faction in the 
KMT Party) who were believed to be chiefly responsible for severe 
factionalism inside the party before then. The second important char-
acteristic of this commission was the close ties of all the members with 
President Chiang. They were either Chiang's former students or loyal 
subordinates, Governor Ch'en Ch'eng exemplifying the latter. Chi-
ang's elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was also a member of the commis-
sion. This was indeed a coherent and consensual leadership. 
Moreover, members of the reform commission were in their prime, 
their average age being 47. Nine out of the sixteen members on the 
commission had acquired a college education from abroad and two 
earned doctoral degrees. Altogether those members of the commis-
sion who had received university educations amounted to fourteen; the 
remaining two received professional military educations. 20 This was 
not only a highly educated, but also a cosmopolitan elite. The compo-
sition of the Central Reform Commission portends enlightened leader-
ship of the Kuomintang ever since 1950. 
To the rest of the Kuomintang, Chiang directed that the party 
must shed its past exclusiveness and cliquishness. Chiang's motto for 
the reform of the body of the Kuomintang was: "Attract new com-
rades on the basis of anti-Communist national salvation and cultivate 
cadres in the practical tasks of political and economic reform." Start-
ing October, 1950, the Kuomintang re-registered its members while 
simultaneously recruited new ones. By May, 1952, the membership of 
the Kuomintarig had been doubled since October, 1950, more than 
half of the members being new. By then an organizational structure 
had already been established; the primary organization of the party, 
the branches, had been organized on the bases of administrative divi-
sion, public office and social grouping. The new membership of the 
Kuomintang was young and broadly representative of society, except 
for the sex ratio. The social composition of the members of the Kuo-
mintang in 1951 is presented in Table 1. 
20. Hsu Fu-min, Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang ti Kai-tsao (1950-1952) Chien-Jun Ch'i-tui 
Chung-hua Min-kuo Cheng-chi Fa-chan ti Ying-hsiang (The Reform of the Kuomintang, 
1950-1952 and Its Impact on the Political Development of the Republic of China). Master 
of Arts Thesis, Institute for the Study of the Three Principles of the People, National Tai-
wan University, Taipei, 1984, pp. 68-72. 
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Table 1-Social Composition of Kuomintang Members (1951)21 
I. Sex (in percentage) 
Male: 94.4 
Female: 5.6 
II. Age Composition (in percentage) 
18 to 30 years old: 48.9 
31 to 40 years old: 31.1 
41 to 50 years old: 15.6 
51 to 60 years old: 4.3 
Above 60 years old: 0.1 
III. Regional origin 
Taiwan: 56.9 
Other: 43.1 
IV. Social Composition 
Peasant: 18.9 
Worker: 20.19 
Business: 10.8 
Intellectual: 40.6 
Others: 8.8 
9 
The most noteworthy point in Table 1 is the more than half of the 
members of the party were natives of Taiwan. Thus, the Kuomintang 
lost no time in integrating the natives into the new political establish-
ment. The members of the party were then organized into some 
30,000 primary organizations which were distributed among all sec-
tors of society. 
With the party organization in order, the Kuomintang quickly 
established a "tutelary democracy" on Taiwan. "Tutelary democ-
racy," as described by Edward Shils, is a variant of "political democ-
racy" which is exemplified by old democratic regimes such as England 
and the United States. "Tutelary democracy" is established by leaders 
who are basically committed to a democratic rule but judging that 
their society has not obtained all the necessary preconditions for 
"political democracy." Tutelary democracy differs from "political de-
mocracy" in having a strong executive and a comparatively weak leg-
islature. Moreover, "the peaks of the executive branch of the 
government and of the dominant party move closer to identity than 
they do in a regime of political democracy. Discipline is maintained in 
both party and state by a strong personality of a coalition of strong 
21. Ibid., p. 154. 
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personalities.'m There are certain basic conditions for the establish-
ment of a tutelary democracy. First, there must be a competent, stable 
and internally coherent elite. This elite must be sufficiently effective, 
in its efforts to modernize the country, and maintain its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the public. Second, the leaders in a tutelary democracy 
must minimize the use of coercion to achieve consensus. The principle 
of loyal opposition must be accepted by the elite in a tutelary democ-
racy though the opposition is held in check by the government. The 
leaders of a tutelary democracy must have at its disposal a competent 
civil service to carry out developmental plans and an effective security 
force to prevent subversion. In a tutelary democracy institutions of 
public opinion such as press, universities and secondary associations in 
society are generally weak and newly established. At the same time 
there must be widespread system of elementary education. Last, tute-
lary democracy "presupposes a generally mild-mannered 
population. "23 
The political situation on Taiwan in the early 1950s was ideal for 
tutelary democracy and the Kuomintang's rule conformed closely to 
Shils' model which was primarily based on the Indian political system. 
As our foregoing discussion has shown, the reform of the Kuomintang 
ensured a coherent elite and the high educational qualification of the 
new leaders of the Kuomintang guaranteed its competence. The orga-
nizational structure of the party further enhanced its effectiveness. 
With Ch'en Ch'eng as the new Premier of the National Government in 
1950, a cabinet of modernizers was formed, including K.C. Yeh (For-
eign Minister), T.W. Yu (Defense Minister), C.K. Yen (Minister of 
Finance), C.Y. Yin (Economic and Industrial Planning), M.L. Chiang 
(Agricultural Development) and S.N. Fu (Education). All of them 
had university educations and most of them had been educated in the 
West. They had never been involved in the political in-fighting on the 
mainland. In their hands, Taiwan's economic development and na-
tion-building had a good start. 
Given its defeat on the mainland, the Kuomintang understanda-
bly was wary of a strong opposition on Taiwan. In principle, however, 
the Kuomintang accepted a loyal opposition, as exemplified in the for-
malistic existence of the Chinese Democratic Social Party (Min She 
Tang) and China Youth Party (Ch'ing Nien Tang). In practice the 
functions of a political opposition were realized on Taiwan in two 
22. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, London and Paris: Mouton 
& Co., 1965, p. 62. 
23. Ibid., pp. 63-67. 
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ways. First, after reorganization of the Kuomintang, those factions 
that had been excluded from the new power alignment within the 
party, especially the members of the former C. C. clique, found an out-
let in the two representative organizations of the National govern-
ment-the Legislative Yuan and the Censorate Yuan (Chien-ch 'a 
Yuan). The function of political opposition on Taiwan is also per-
formed by the elective officials in local government. The institution of 
local election is perhaps the strongest statement of the Kuomintang's 
basic commitment to a democratic rule. Elections of municipal and 
county government leaders began in 1950 and that of provincial as-
sembly, 1957. These elections not only gave the native Taiwanese a 
voice in the government but also enabled the Kuomintang to link itself 
with local notables who, in the 1950s, were often elected to public 
offices. For example, in 1950, of the 21 county and municipal leaders 
elected, the Kuomintang candidates captured 17. The mayors of two 
major cities, that of Taichung and Tainan, were not Kuomintang can-
didates. However, after their victory in election, both mayors were 
induced by the Kuomintang to be members of the party.24 These 
measures have ensured at least some communications between the rul-
ing Kuomintang and the real or potential opposition. 
A tutelary democracy, as mentioned earlier, must have a compe-
tent civil service. After its move to Taiwan, the National government 
carried out regular civil service examinations to maintain standards 
among civil servants. From 1950 to 1981, the government held 32 
general civil service examinations. In 1971, of those newly appointed 
civil servants, 24.4 percent had been qualified in civil service examina-
tions; the percentage of the same had increased to 38.18 in 1982. In 
1971, the percentage of civil servants having university educations was 
38.18; by 1982, it had risen to 60.2. 25 The civil service examinations 
provided the aspirants in society with a regular route to social and 
economic mobility and also infused the bureaucracy with new blood. 
A tutelary democracy is also based on relatively weak institutions 
of public opinion. When the Japanese left after the war, there was 
only one newspaper for the native population. After the move of the 
National government to Taiwan, partly due to economic stringency 
and the government's experience on the mainland (heavy communist 
penetration in privately-owned newspapers in the major cities during 
1947-1949), the government used the rationing of newsprint to check 
the growth of newspapers. As a result, the number of newspapers, 
24. Hsu Fu-min, supra note 20, p. 157. 
25. Ibid., p. 200. 
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after its initial spurt from one in 1945 to 30 in 1952, stood at 31 in 
1981.26 However, the circulation of newspaper has grown tremen-
dously over the years. The number of copies of newspapers available 
to every one hundred households on Taiwan increased from 16.27 in 
1961 to 58.85 in 1980.27 Other institutions of public opinion were 
similarly weak when the Kuomintang moved to Taiwan. There were, 
for example, only one university and three colleges on Taiwan in 1950 
and the number of university and college students constituted only 
0.71 per cent of the total population.28 However, under Japanese rule, 
there was universal elementary education which the Nationalist gov-
ernment further expanded. All these initially facilitated the Kuomin-
tang's establishment of a tutelary democracy on Taiwan. 
"The regime of tutelary democracy," writes Shils, "presupposes a 
generally mild-mannered population, not frequently given to tumultu-
ous manifestations, without intense politicalloyalties."29 Despite the 
riot of February 28, 194 7, which was confined largely to few cities, the 
native population of Taiwan, being predominantly rural in the early 
1950s, was fairly quiescent. The successful land reform that the gov-
ernment carried out in the early 1950s further tended to ensure a basi-
cally supportive population. 
The foregoing accounts largely for the political stability of Tai-
wan which in turn laid the foundation for economic growth over the 
last thirty-some years. 
COMMUNITY OF MODERNIZERS 
As mentioned earlier, the chief raison d'etre of a tutelary democ-
racy is effective leadership for national development, with economic 
groWth as the pivot. Experience in the newly developing nations has 
shown that for economic growth to occur, there must first be a strong 
political will to development, and secondly, there must be a commu-
nity of modernizers whom political leaders entrust to plan for and exe-
cute development. As subsequent discussion will show, these 
26. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1982, Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, Executive Yuan, 1982, p. 260. 
27. Chung-hua Min-kuo Liu-shih-chiu-nien She-hui Chih-piao T'ung-chi (Social Indica-
tors of the Republic of China, 1980), Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1981, p. 138. 
28. Lin Ch'ing-chiang, "Kao-deng Chiao-yu" (Higher Education) in Chung-hua Ming-
kuo K'ai-kuo Ch'i-shih-nien chih Chiao-yu (Se.-enty Years of Education in the Republic of 
China), Volume One, Taipei: Kuang-wen Book Company, 1981, pp. 228-229. 
29. Shils (1965), supra note 22, p. 66. 
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conditions for economic growth were fulfilled on Taiwan in the early 
1950s. 
Politically, as discussed in the previous section, President Chiang 
had put his own personal status and reputation behind the goal of 
building Taiwan. Moreover, the reform of the Kuomintang enabled 
President Chiang to delegate securely the task of development to the 
experienced Ch'en Ch'eng. By 1950 Ch'en had been a loyal 
subordinate of President Chiang for some 26 years. In terms of out-
look Ch'en was much like Chiang; though having purely military edu-
cation Ch'en respected the knowledge and views of specialists. Ch'en's 
experience in combating the communists on the mainland further con-
vinced him the urgency of economic development, especially agricul-
tural reform. 
Next to the strong commitment of National government to devel-
opment, a crucial factor in Taiwan's successful economic growth is the 
close tie and mutual trust between political leaders and specialists in 
economic planning. These conditions were obtained in Taiwan in the 
early 1950s partly because of the small number of elites at the top, and 
partly due to the natural selection process in that those who did not 
feel loyal to the Kuomintang had either defected to the Communist 
side or fled abroad. Those specialists who went to Taiwan maintained 
long careers of loyal service with the Nationalist government; neither 
Chiang nor Ch'en had any anxiety of entrusting Taiwan's develop-
ment to these professionals. The careers of Chung-yung Yin and Kuo-
ting Li, two pivotal figures in Taiwan's economic development, exem-
plify the politically reliable background of the specialists. Trained as 
an electrical engineer and a graduate of modern China's most prestigi-
ous technological university-the University of Communications of 
Shanghai-Yin had already been in the service of the Nationalists for 
some 24 years when he became the head of the Industrial Council of 
the Economic Stability Board in 1950. The Economic Stability Board 
soon became the highest planning body in Taiwan. K.T. Li is by train-
ing a nuclear physicist who interrupted his advanced study at Cam-
bridge University in 1937 to return to China, hoping to aid the 
country's resistance against Japan's invasion. Throughout the war Li 
worked in various capacities, involving mainly technological innova-
tions to help China's war effort. Both Yin and Li were on the staff of 
the prestigious National Resources Commission before 1949. In 1948, 
Li was assigned to Taiwan to take over the shipbuilding industry that 
Japan had left behind. Before long Li joined Yin in the Industrial 
Council. Both Yin and Li later became Ministers of Economic Af-
fairs. Thus their long careers with the Nationalist government earned 
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them the basic trust of the leaders of the Kuomintang. A community 
of modernizers formed around Yin and Li, whose contribution to Tai-
wan's economic growth was vital. 
The role of a community of modernizers to a nation's develop-
ment, as pointed out by both Pye and Shils, is not limited to econom-
ics. These specialists, in contrast to demagogic politicians, have a 
secure sense of self-identity and effectiveness. They provide their soci-
ety with a constructive role model. With such a community of mod-
ernizers, in the words of Pye, "national development would be 
furthered as ever-increasing numbers of competent people meet in 
their daily lives the exacting but also psychologically reassuring stan-
dards of professional performance basic to the modern world. " 30 
To study the community of modernizers on Taiwan this author 
has analyzed the educational background of 44 members of the follow-
ing organizations that have been the centers of Taiwan economic plan-
ning: the Council for Regulation of Productive Enterprises (the 
earliest economic planning body), the Economic Stability Board, the 
Council for U.S. Aid, the Council for International Economic Cooper-
ation and Development and the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development. The result is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2-The Educational Qualification of Economic planners31 
I. Highest Educational Attainment 
1. University education: 43 (97.72% of 
total) 
2. Advanced education abroad: 
United States: 23 (52.27%) 
West Europe: 4 (9.09%) 
Japan:1 
II. Area of Specialization 
1. Engineering: 21 (47.72%) 
2. Social Science: 15 (34.09%) (12 econo-
mists, 2 legal specialists and one special-
ist in administration) 
3. Science: 3 (6.82%) 
4. Military: 1 (2.27%) 
5. Unknown: 4 (9.09%) 
30. Pye, supra note 15, p. 289. See also Shils (1965), supra note 22, p. 24. 
31. The sample of 44 planners is drawn from Chung-hua Min-kuo Tang-tai Ming-jen-lu 
(Who's Who in the Republic of China), Volume I-III, Taipei: Chung-hua Book Company, 
1978. 
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There are two noteworthy aspects of the educational background 
of Taiwan's top economic planners. First, they are truly an intellec-
tual elite, all except one receiving a university education. Moreover, 
more than half of them were educated in the United States and West-
ern Europe. This cannot but influence the perspectives of these plan-
ners. That Taiwan has adopted a free market economy must have had 
something to do with the educational background of these planners. 
Second, in terms of training, one sees predominance of engineers and 
scientists in the highest council on economic planning. According to 
economist Tao-yung Wang, himself one of the planners, there is a ba-
sic difference in the perspectives of engineers and scientists on the one 
side and the social scientists on the other. The engineer-or scientist-
turned-planners-tend to be cautious, with accent on stability and 
steadiness. These specialists take a project-by-project approach to de-
velopment. The social scientists, being predominantly economists, 
tend to be macroscopic in their views. Professor Wang, for example, 
both in his written works and interview with this author, strongly ad-
vocated a "revolutionary" approach to Taiwan's economic planning. 32 
However, in the highest council of economic planning in the Republic 
of China, it was the specialists who took the initial command of plan-
ning. As we mentioned earlier, the two most influential planners-
C.Y. Yin and K.T. Li-were respectively an electrical engineer and a 
nuclear physicist. It is plausible that President Chiang and especially 
former Vice President Ch'en deliberately entrusted planning to spe-
cialists for their pragmatic attitudes. President Chiang had empha-
sized a practical approach in Taiwan's development. 
In the background of the economic planners of the Republic of 
China we see a unique approach. According to Waterston, an author-
ity in development planning, the standard pattern in the organization 
of economic planning is a predominance of economists. Specialists are 
concentrated at the operating level. Waterston stresses the need for 
economists to master a degree of technical and scientific knowledge in 
order to facilitate planning. 33 In the Republic of China, this standard 
pattern has been reversed. In the highest council of planning on Tai-
wan, it was the specialists who predominated and mastered general 
knowledge of economics, public administration and law. C.Y. Yin, for 
example, became a voracious reader of books in economics in the 
32. Interview with Professor Wang in Taipei, July 1982. See also Wang Tso-yung, 
Taiwan Ching-chi Fa-chan Lun-wen-chi (An Anthology of Taiwan's Economic Develop-
ment), Taipei: Shih-pao Wen-hua Publishing Company, 1982, p. 141 and 224. 
33. Albert Waterston, Development Planning. Lessons of Experience, Baltimore, Mary-
land: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, p. 517 and 535. 
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1950s and would sometimes lament the lack of opportunity for him to 
discuss issues with trained economists. 34 Later Yin would be the first 
person to introduce Rostow's concept of "economic take-off'' to the 
fledgling entrepreneurs ofTaiwan. 35 According to K.T. Li, his knowl-
edge of general economics and development was acquired in actual 
work and in international economic conferences such as those spon-
sored by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the 
United Nations. The process of transformation from a nuclear physi-
cist to economic planner, says Li, has been natural as he moved from 
technical to general planning jobs. 36 Let us hazard a hypothesis here. 
That is: it is more feasible and probably profitable for a technical or 
scientific specialist to acquire the knowledge and competence of a 
generalist in economic planning than the other way around. The ex-
amples of Yin, Li and their associates have shown that their primary 
calling-as engineers or scientists-has had an overall impact in their 
work, witnessing Taiwan's pragmatic and steady approach to eco-
nomic development. Furthermore, both Yin and Li have been highly 
conscious of their role transformation. Yin, for example, once said 
that being an engineer one must have a scientist's spirit of searching 
for truth and the practical methodology of an economist. "In other 
words," Yin stated, "an engineer is a scientist who is knowledgeable 
about economics."37 To K.T. Li, the most important quality that the 
engineers and scientists had imparted to Taiwan's economic planning 
is the spirit of objectivity. 38 
The background of these modernizers on Taiwan tells us much 
about the success of the Republic of China's economic development. 
These specialist-turned-planners eschewed grandiose scheme, concen-
trated on workable projects, rejected bureaucratic monopoly, favored 
free market enterprise, and accepted readily new knowledge and expe-
rience from the advanced nations of the world. Our analysis of the 
background of Taiwan's economic planners and their close collabora-
tion with the political leaders of the Republic of China further con-
firms Waterston's observation that the key to economic planning and 
34. Wang Kung-chi, "My Memory of Yin Chung-yung," Chung-wai Journal, Volume 
6, No. 1 (July 1969) as reprinted in Hua-fu Yu-pao (The Washington China Post), (March 
30, 1984), p. 4. 
35. Yin Chung-yung, Wo-tui Tai-wan Ching-chi Te K'an-fa (My Views on Taiwan's 
Economy), Volume 3, Taipei: Council for Economic Planning, The Executive Yuan, Re-
public of China, 1973, p. 73. 
36. Interview with K.T. Li, July 1982, in Taipei. 
37. Yin Chung-yung, supra note 35, p. 202. 
38. Supra note 36. 
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development is political rather than economic. 39 
RISE OF ENTREPRENEURS 
Whereas the community of modernizers discussed in the previous 
section is the pivot of Taiwan's superstructure of economic develop-
ment, the new class of modern entrepreneurs on Taiwan is the main 
force in the infrastructure of Taiwan's dynamic economy and society. 
The rise of the entrepreneurial class in Taiwan bespeaks the popular 
participation in Taiwan's modernization since, as shall soon be demon-
strated, most of the entrepreneurs are natives of Taiwan. The entre-
preneurs class also provides the answer to the "riddle" of Taiwan's 
success-modernization requires the psychic mobilization of members 
of society (the concept that the communists on the Chinese mainland 
only now become dimly aware of). The role of entrepreneurs, as that 
of specialist-turned-planners, is not limited to economics only. As 
mentioned earlier, the specialists in the highest councils of economic 
planning have imparted a sense of secure identity and effectiveness to 
the whole nation. The modern entrepreneurs are living models to the 
Chinese people of the profitability of social change. Moreover, the ca-
reers of modern entrepreneurs represent the quintessence of modern 
men who are characterized by being unafraid of change, alertness to 
new opportunity, strategic planning and, above all, a work ethic. 
At the outset of Taiwan's economic development there was little 
or no native entrepreneurial class. It was Japan's colonial policy to 
keep the natives from positions of power in Taiwan's economy. Sa-
muel Ho writes: 
Until 1924 Taiwanese were not allowed to organize or oper-
ate corporations unless there was Japanese participation. 
Even after this restrictive rule against Taiwanese participa-
tion was rescinded, Taiwanese were reluctant to seek entry to 
the modern corporate sector because of its domination by 
Japanese capitalists. Through its power to regulate and li-
cense and by granting exclusive privileges to Japanese capi-
talists, the government successfully kept economic power 
from the Taiwanese. 40 
Hence, initially, the Nationalist government had to rely on a small 
number of entrepreneurs from the mainland. Furthermore, the gov-
ernment often assumed an entrepreneurial role itself by first establish-
ing new industries such as textiles and then cultivated private 
39. Waterston, supra note 33, p. 3, 161 and 348. 
40. Samuel Ho, supra note 6, p. 38. 
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entrepreneurs to gradually take over the industries. In the early 
1950s, for example, the Nationalist government, to rectify Taiwan's 
heavy dependence on Japanese cloth, actively promoted domestic tex-
tile industry. On the one hand, the government limited import of cot-
ton cloth so as to restrict competition. On the other hand, the 
government supplied textile factories with raw cotton and bought back 
the fabrics. The manufacturers thus reaped almost net profits. Under 
this policy of fostership, Taiwan's textile industry grew rapidly and 
became the most important industry and export item in Taiwan's eco-
nomic take-off.41 According to C.Y. Yin, almost all major industries 
of Taiwan were started this way-government initiation followed by 
private takeover and expansion.42 However, through the 1950s and 
1960s Yin regularly lamented the absence of a class of modern entre-
preneurs to fuel Taiwan's economy. Had Yin lived for another decade 
(Yin passed away in 1963), he would have felt vindicated. For by the 
late 1970s, a new class of modern entrepreneurs has, in the words of 
Tso-yung Wang, "already been formed."43 These new entrepreneurs, 
according to Wang, are mostly young, well educated, possessing the 
knowledge of modern management and a venturesome tendency, being 
alert to opportunity and willing to innovate. 
To analyze the background of the modern entrepreneurs, this au-
thor has done a preliminary analysis of the 3,000 persons listed in the 
Chung-hua Min-kuo Ch 'i-yeh Ming-jen-lu (Taiwan Who's Who in 
Business), the 1979-1980 edition.44 Due to the lack of standardization 
of data in the Who's Who, however, the total numbers of each category 
do not necessarily correspond to each other. For example, not every 
person in the book is given a birth date. Of the total 3,000 entries, 
information on age is listed for only 2,699 persons. Table 3 presents 
the result of preliminary analysis. 
First of all, in terms of regional origin, the Who's Who lists 1,863 
natives of Taiwan (68.9% of total) and 840 (31.4%) of mainland ori-
gin; hence the native entrepreneurs outnumber mainland entrepre-
neurs more than two to one. Table 3 shows clearly that the native 
entrepreneurs are younger than those from the mainland and substan-
tially so. 
41. Wang Tso-yung, Wo-men Lu-ho Ch'uang-tsao-liao Ching-chi Ch'i-chi (How Did 
We Create Economic Miracle), Taipei: Shih-pao Wen-hua Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 
25-26. 
42. C.Y. Yin, Volume 3, supra note 35, p. 107. 
43. Wang Tso-yung (1978), supra note 41, p. 114. 
44. Chung-hua Min-kuo Ch'i-yeh Min-jen-lu, 1979-1980 (Taiwan Who's Who in Busi-
ness, 1979-1980), Taipei: Harvard Management Service, Inc., copyright 1978. 
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Table 3-Age, Regional Origin and Occupation of Entrepreneurs in 
the Republic of China, 1979-1980 
Taiwan Mainland Total Person 
Median Age 45.8 (1893) 58.9 (806) 2699 
Occupation (in percentage) 
Manufacturing 62.22% 50.06% 1464 
Textile 12.8% 15.18% 
Paper 12.72 10.6 
Chemical 18.52 20.75 
Electronics 14.20 15.19 
Food 9.82 6.58 
Machine Tool 9.16 6.83 
Construction 11.00 15.30 310 
Managerial 10.18 14.57 290 
Service 9.42 10.60 246 
In terms of occupation, though manufacturing constitutes the largest 
number of entrepreneurs in both groups, the internal composition 
reveals interesting differences between the two groups. Possibly due to 
superior experience and education, mainland entrepreneurs tend to 
concentrate in textile, electronics, construction and managerial occu-
pations. There is a more even spread of occupations among native 
entrepreneurs. Possibly due to their access to local resources and the 
residue of Japanese colonial influence (exclusion of Taiwanese from 
more modem industries), Taiwanese entrepreneurs tend to be more 
attracted than mainlanders to paper making, food processing and 
machine tools. Most important of all, Table 3 reveals no mainlander's 
monopoly. The occupations and industries that are most consequent-
ial for the mainlanders are also most consequential for the natives of 
Taiwan. The entrepreneurs of modem Taiwan are well integrated. 
To further probe into the background of native entrepreneurs, I 
analyze their regional (internal to Taiwan) origins as presented in Ta-
ble 4 and Table 5. Both tables show clearly that the Taipei region has 
the heaviest concentration of entrepreneurs and that the Taipei re-
gion's share of entrepreneurs from the pool corresponds closely to its 
share of the total population. That of course is not surprising given 
the advanced state of Taipei's urbanization and commerce. The cases 
of Taichung and Tainan region are interesting. As for Taichung one 
sees from Table 5 that its share of entrepreneurs is higher than its 
share of the total population. This tends to correspond to one's im-
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pressionistic picture of Taichung's being a boom town. In reality, the 
Taichung region is rapidly following Taipei's footstep in economic de-
velopment. The situation is reversed in the case of the Tainan area. 
Taitung, or the eastern part of Taiwan, remains the backwater of the 
country. 
Table 4-Regional Origin of Native Entrepreneurs 
Place of Origin Number of Percentage 
EntreEreneurs of Total 
Taipei municipality 372 22.35 
Tainan county 235 14.12 
Taichung county 204 12.25 
Changhua county 159 9.55 
Kaohsiung county 141 8.47 
Taipei county 113 6.79 
Chiayi county 74 4.47 
T'aoyuan county 55 3.30 
Miaoli county 51 3.06 
Yunlin county 50 3.0 
Hsinchu county 64 3.84 
Yilan 50 3.0 
Nant'ou 34 2.04 
Pingtong 38 2.28 
Hualien 14 0.84 
Penghu 10 0.60 
Taitung 2 0.10 
1863 total 97.78% 
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Table 5-Percentage of Entrepreneurs Compared with Population 
Distribution 
Region Entrepreneurs Population 
(Percentage of Total) (Percentage of Total) 
Taipei* 36.28 34.66** 
Taichung 24.86 20.51 
Tainan 24.87 26.03 
*Taipei region includes: Taipei city, Taipei county, Hsinchu and T'aoyuan 
Taichung: Taichung city, Taichung county, Miaoli, Changhua and Nant'ou 
Tainan: Tainan city, Tainan county, Kaohsiung city, Kaohsiung county, Pingtong 
county. 
**These population percentages are calculated from the 1980 census figures in T'ung-chi 
T'i-yao (Statistical Abstracts) (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Sta-
tistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1981), p. 32. 
There are aspects of Taiwan's entrepreneurial class that are not 
evident in the statistical analysis presented here. For example, the en-
trepreneurial establishments are relatively of small scale. It is reported 
that 95 per cent of the enterprises on Taiwan are of small and medium 
size with capital of less than US $500,000.45 Economist Tso-yung 
Wang wrote in 1973: "Our industrial technology is still composed of 
textile, cement, glass, paper, lumber, rubber, plastics, electric appli-
ance, bicycle and sewing machine. These are technologies of the nine-
teenth century. We have not yet succeeded in greatly increasing the 
industries of the twentieth century such as steel, automobile, ship-
building and machine tools."46 Another sample of the entrepreneurs 
on Taiwan analyzed, while corresponding in general to the results of 
Table 3-5, shows the significant percentage of managerial and com-
mercial occupations, being 31.86 among the mainlanders and 24.3 
among the Taiwan natives.47 Though these tertiary professions are an 
essential component of a modern economy, they contribute less than 
the true entrepreneurs in making the total "economic pie" bigger. 
That these administrative and trade specialists have a significant pro-
45. Free China Journal, tJuly 22, 1984), p. I. 
46. Wang Tso-yung (1982), supra note 32, p. 418. 
47. This sample is from Who's Who in the Republic of China, supra note 31. It consists 
of 182 mainland and 288 native Taiwan entrepreneurs. I have excluded 93 mainland and 
10 Taiwanese names from my sample as their occupations do not really belong to en-
trepreneurial activity. 
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portion in Taiwan's entrepreneurial class is probably due to Taiwan's 
close tie with the international market. 
In the final analysis the rise of a modem entrepreneurial class on 
Taiwan lends a significant legitimacy to the "tutelary democracy" that 
the Kuomintang has established. The native entrepreneurs are also 
the strongest testimony to Taiwan's record of achieving both develop-
ment and social equity. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the success of the Kuomintang leadership of eco-
nomic growth on Taiwan is based on four political factors. First, tute-
lary democracy is a viable form of government during transition and 
provides a stable order for long-range development. In such a political 
system, a degree of centralization of decision-making at national level 
is combined with local political participation. Second, political 
leader's support to specialists in development is absolutely necessary 
for economic growth. The specialists who planned Taiwan's economy, 
men such as C.Y. Yin and K.T. Li, had encountered strong opposition 
and interference during their careers; their most dogged detractors 
were those politicians who had lost their factional base in the executive 
branch or inside the Kuomintang and entrenched themselves in the 
legislative and the "censorate" branch of the government. Both Yin 
and Li had been falsely charged with collusion with private interests 
by these disgruntled politicians. But the strong backing that both Yin 
and Li received from President Chiang Kai-shek and Vice President 
Ch'en Ch'eng, especially the latter, enabled the former to weather the 
storms. Third, the success of Taiwan's economic growth points to the 
importance of making good use of the knowledgeable and cosmopoli-
tan elements of society. Unlike the leaders of the Communist Party on 
mainland China, virulent anti-intellectualism has not affected the Na-
tionalist government. Thus the knowledgeable class on Taiwan was 
able to use its talents to build up Taiwan and provide society with a 
positive role model. The contrast with the communist rule of the 
mainland on this score cannot be sharper. There Mao subjected the 
knowledgeable elements (except for those in nuclear weaponry and 
rocketry) to persistent persecutions. The contrasting results of Tai-
wan's dynamic economy and society and the crisis and poverty-ridden 
society on the mainland are significantly due to the different roles that 
the knowledgeable elements have played in the two Chinese societies. 
Fourth, Taiwan's economic success speaks strongly for the fact that 
the government can never substitute for entrepreneurs. The relation-
ship between government and entrepreneurs should be symbiotic. 
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Again the contrasting result of the economic crisis on the mainland 
accentuates the importance of entrepreneurs in a nation's economic 
development. On the mainland, the Communist Party eliminated the 
entrepreneurs as a class through its "Socialist transformation." The 
bureaucratic centralism that the Communist Party established had 
mismanaged the economy so much that drastic reform is called for as 
recent development on mainland China has shown. 
There is one last lesson to be learned from the success of the Kuo-
mintang leadership of Taiwan's economic development. That is, had 
the Kuomintang had the right environment on the mainland before 
1949, conceivably it would have been equally successful in building up 
the mainland, for in the 1930s, before Japan's attack, and in the short 
period after the war, the Kuomintang used the same model of develop-
ment as it did on Taiwan. Arthur Young put it well: "Had the Na-
tionalists been granted the opportunity, their past record and 
resourcefulness suggest that they could have found means to promote 
sustained growth within the framework of a fairly free economic sys-
tem. " 48 In this perspective, though the Kuomintang lost the battle in 
1949, it won the war of modernizing China. Though the Chinese 
Communists will never admit this openly, their post-Mao reforms, 
however, have made the admission of their failure implicitly, and 
borne out the success and victory of the Kuomintang. 
48. Arthur N. Young, China's Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937, Stanford, Calif.: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 428. 
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